During the Cold War, U.S. foreign intervention was often explained by invoking the “domino theory” in an effort to clarify the containment doctrine.
The underlying fear was that if one regional pivot or “domino” were to fall under the spell of a leftist regime or even direct Soviet control, then other countries in that area would fall even quicker than the first “domino,” to paraphrase Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Because of this fear, anything from diplomatic coercion to openly helping overthrow an elected government to waging war was on the table to prevent the spread of the U.S.S.R.’s sphere, as it was seen as the largest threat to the U.S. from about 1947 until its collapse in 1991.
So then, given that the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, why is the U.S. still employing many of the same tactics it used during the Cold War to alter governments of a leftist ilk without the spectre of Soviet domination looming in the distance?
As it turns out, U.S. foreign policy objectives have more to do with whether or not a state can be used to the maximum utility of U.S. interests as opposed to actual national security. The U.S. is in an almost historically unparalleled security position, one only enhanced by modern technology, and has very few enemies who pose a serious threat.
However, when a nation does something that reduces its utility for the U.S. and/or American interests, it is typical of America to intervene under whichever pretext the government sees fit.
The U.S. has either used its own military force or armed/backed a coup in Grenada in 1983, Nicaragua under the Sandinistas the first time, Chile under Allende in 1973 and Guatemala in 1954 – just to name some of the more well-known cases. In each, the pretext for intervention was national security. Yes, even for Grenada, a country of 100,000—so small you may not be able to find it with a map.
Enter Latin America’s so-called “Pink Wave” of anti-Neoliberal presidents starting around the turn of the new millennium and continuing through the George W. Bush and Obama administrations.
After Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez embarked on a somewhat run-of-the-mill socialist agenda, which included public ownership of a few key industries, the Bush administration openly recognized a coup d’etat in 2002 as legitimate within hours of it occurring despite its illegality and unconstitutionality in Venezuela.
President Obama, as recently as March, declared Venezuela a “security threat” while his administration created a petroleum organization, the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, to try to undermine the oil alliance Chávez started between Caribbean states and Venezuela.
Though this time, organizations like USAID, in conjunction with U.S. embassies in Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Ecuador all helped to coordinate opposition funding, at the minimum, for the parties and organizations opposing left-leaning leaders in these countries.
Having a hunch that this was the case could have been understandable, but WikiLeaks cables have since confirmed all of these suspicions and allegations from the leaders of these countries.
Without the official need for “containment” any longer, and without a second global hegemony as a threat, the old strategies continue to be used time and time again, despite no evidence that anyone in the hemisphere is plotting to attack U.S. soil.
Especially in Latin America, the reason for U.S. intervention is simple: keeping others in line with U.S. interests is paramount and the current order must, at the minimum, be maintained. Stepping out of line cannot be tolerated.
Scott Schroder is a senior political science major from Houston, Texas.
