Sometimes when I write an opinion piece on an issue, I do not really give a definitive answer to that issue so much as raise questions over it. This article will be one such time.
If this article were about my position on Israel’s settlements in Palestine, it would have been very easy to write because I know exactly where I stand on the settlements: I can’t denounce them more, even if my life depended on it. But this article isn’t as much about the settlements as much as it’s about one specific thing: what caused this “particular” conflict?
I have been closely following the recent and ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel, and I find that there is something very eerie about the timeline of events —or perhaps, their lineup. With that in mind, join me in attempting to connect the dots.
April 1, 2014, about 7 a.m.: Israel makes a surprise announcement of a plan to build 700 more settlement units, an announcement which came in the middle of U.S.-mediated peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. A fatal blow to the peace effort, the announcement impedes the progress of process so much that Kerry decides to review with President Obama if the peace talks should continue. The announcement, in addition, comes days after Israel’s refusal to release the fourth and final group of Palestinian prisoners at the end of March. Relevant — the announced settlements are illegal under international law.
April 1, 2014, by evening: Almost as a response, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a politician known to seek only internationally-recognized diplomatic means, in turn signs a “State of Palestine” application requesting to join 15 United Nations agencies in the West Bank city of Ramallah.
April 2, 2014: Threats of further annexation and financial sanctions are thrown on the table by Netanyahu’s right-wing Israel. Take, for example, Tourism Minister Uzi Landau who makes the following statement in Israel Radio: “If they are now threatening (to go to UN institutions), they must know something simple: They will pay a heavy price.” Then he adds: “One of the possible measures will be Israel applying sovereignty over areas that will clearly be part of the State of Israel in any future solution.”
Deputy Knesset Speaker Moshe Feiglin shares the same sentiment by calling on Israel to “announce the cancellation of the infernal [Oslo] agreements and to exercise Israeli sovereignty over all the territory.” The possibility of imposing financial sanctions, moreover, is raised.
April 23 2014: Rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas agree on a unity reconciliation pact that will officially unite the two under one technocrat government, ending the division between them for the first time since their civil war in 2007. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has steered the course of endeavors towards the unity, gives assurances that the new government will stick to the Quartet principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and compliance with previous PLO and the PA agreements.
April 24 2014: Despite Abbas’s assurances, Israel is further enraged by the Palestinian unity. In reaction to the rising coalition, the Israeli government abruptly halts already shaky U.S.-brokered peace negotiations with the Palestinians—namely, Fatah—only days before the date the process was scheduled to expire, April 29. Commenting on Israel’s decision to suspend the negotiations with the Palestinian president, Netanyahu says, “[Abbas] needs to choose between peace with Israel and an accord with Hamas.”
May 2014: Much back-and-forth tension between Israel and Palestine. The U.S. hedges its bets, praising and, in effect, taking part in Israel’s so-called wait-and-see approach, while at the same time inviting, even welcoming, Palestinian unity government’s Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah to Washington. Aside from the State Department’s equivocal support of Israel, Netanyahu faces a combination of domestic and international criticism of his political rigidness. The Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth favorably cites an unnamed U.S. official as assigning the blame for the failure of peace talks to the Israeli side, saying that Netanyahu “did not move more than an inch” and further noting that, “What I do know is that in the midst of negotiations, the settlement announcements — not so much the tenders but the combination of the tenders and planning, coming as each tranche of (Palestinian) prisoners were released — had a dramatically damaging impact on the negotiations.” The interview in which that remark was made was cleared by the White House. The unnamed U.S. official later turns out to be U.S. envoy Martin Indyk. Mr. Indyk later tendered his resignation and returned to his old post.
International pressure on Israel (for its rejection of the Hamas-Fatah unity and thwarting the peace negotiation) continues with the surge of the “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” campaign in support of the Palestinians following the recent events.
June 2, 2014: This is the day the government unity is set to be officially enacted. Only one problem: the inchoate consensus government is nearly falling apart because of a last minute disagreement. Abbas for untold reasons wants the ministry of Prisoners Affairs dismantled or placed under his administration directly. Grudgingly, Hamas, after much push-back, makes a concession to Abbas, agreeing to have the ministry supplanted by a committee and merged into the Prime Minister portfolio. The government is officially sworn in as technocrat government comprised of 17 politically “unaffiliated” ministers. This is in addition to Abbas’s renewed assurance of a new government committed to non-violence.
Israel, however, imposes “unspecified sanctions” against the Palestinian Authority. The U.S. sticks to its wait-and-see approach by “watching closely to ensure that it upholds principles that President Abbas reiterated,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. On the whole, Palestine, both Gaza strip and the West bank, now enjoys a fair degree of worldwide sympathy and support, while, on the other hand, Israel faces the danger of potential international isolation.
June 2014: Three Israeli teenagers are mysteriously kidnapped and later killed allegedly by Hamas as Netanyahu claims: “Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will pay.” Yet, so far, there appears to be no evidence to the effect of that statement, which was made despite equally plausible claims that the abduction is more likely the work of local individuals unassociated with Hamas and acting recklessly with no regard for the consequences of their action.
Theories such as those of Global Research, Patrick Cockburn, Gershon Baskin and Sheera Frenkel argue for good reasons that it makes little sense for Hamas, at this point, to engage in violent acts immediately after signing the unity agreement. In other words, the theory goes, if Hamas has willingly signed an agreement to form a unity with the known-to-be non-violent West Bank under Abbas, why would they resort to the very same activities that for seven years have precluded such unity in the first place? None of Hamas officials claim responsibility for the kidnapping.
July 2014: Netanyahu, however, loses no time to seize the opportunity. He acts on his threat, authorizing “Operation Protective Edge,” an aerial and ground attack on condensed Gaza. This has led to rockets launching from Gaza on Israel as well. The wanton Israeli destruction of the strip came with no discrimination between hide-outs or tunnels and civilian homes.
July 25, 2014:Police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld tells Jon Donnison of the BBC that militants who murdered the boys were a “lone cell” who, while maybe having tenuous connections to Hamas, did not act under the group’s leadership. If it was ordered by Hamas leadership, Israeli spokesman Rosenfeld also tells Donnison, the Israelis would have known about it in advance.
Despite the increasing doubts over Israel’s pretext for launching the operation, the bombing does not stop still.
As of the end of July, more than 2,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians, and 67 Israelis, three of them civilians, are killed. The number of Palestinian injuries and displacements would be too numerous to count here.
August 22, 2014: A turn of events. A Hamas West Bank leader (a terrorist in my view, actually) by the name of Salah Arouri praises the “heroic action” of kidnapping the Israeli kids, hoping to exchange the youths for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. With no other Hamas member claiming responsibility, Arouri explicitly “boasts” that he was behind the attack. But know this about the guy: he’s been living inexile in Turkey for a number of years. Before that, he lived, also in exile, in Syria until the breakout of the Syrian crisis. And before Syria, he spent a 15-year jail sentence in an Israeli prison. In other words, his background seems to strengthen rather than weaken the claim that kidnappers have been a “lone cell” acting without the approval of Hamas.
The timing and nature of Arouri’s admission raises some suspicion to me. Why would a Hamas “West Bank” leader who has lived in exile for years painstakingly take such pride in claiming the kidnapping as his “Palestinian achievement”?
It is as though Arouri sees it as a defeat when the world gets close to being convinced that kidnappings are not “achieved” by his brigades; otherwise why would this statement come out only now? If you remember Abbas’s insistence to have the Ministry of Prisoners Affairs dismantled in the new unity government, could Arouri’s plan to kidnap Israeli youths and exchange them for Palestinian prisoners be an act of protest in spite of Abbas’s policy? Could it be after all that Arouri’s statement is but to prove his still unceasing sway in the West Bank, over which Abbas presides?
Furthermore, Israel reacted to the unity between the West Bank and Gaza with unquestioned hostility. Are there no ties at all between Israel’s registered threatening against the Palestinians for forming such unity and the blanket bombing of Gaza? Could the kidnappings have been but the gift that fell into Netanyahu’s lap to make the bombing justifiable? Who really caused the conflict to become what it is now?
I sincerely do not know if Hamas is a terrorist organization. Maybe it is. Who knows? Maybe it is Nelson Mandela in the making. Maybe it will never be. But I can say frankly that, at least at this moment, Hamas is too problematic a group for me to defend. Yet, I can also say that I hardly find it believable that there is no connection whatsoever between the Palestinian unity agreement Israel dreaded and the maniac bombing of Gaza the Palestinians incurred.
Ahmed Seif is an English graduate student from Alexandria, Egypt.
Follow him on twitter @ahseif86
