Picture yourself in the midst of a prolonged tailgating event, at a vast, public square. People are ubiquitous across the entire horizon. Tents are everywhere. You do not have a tent of your own, so you just wander from one tent to the next. As you roam, you watch and observe. Some people are relaxing in their tents, others are glued to their phones with their fingertips hitting the touch screens with passion, tweeting and posting their opinions on all forms of social media. Next to every tent, strangers are standing by, chatting away like old friends. The tailgating activities are like none that you have seen before.
At one corner, there is a stand-up comedian putting on a puppet show to sound the truth about a corrupt politician. With every punch line, the audience laughs. They laugh and hope. They hope for freedom. Across from the loud laughter, there is a local singer with an exotic Middle Eastern guitar, playing melodies of his own composing, singing lyrics of his own crafting. He sings of freedom. In the distance, there is yet another group, rallying around a lady whose speech appears to make enough sense to keep her audience no less than captivated. And every once in a while, together they cheer. They cheer for freedom. Out of nowhere, a strange chant in a strange language is heard. Following the chant, people go to their knees and place their foreheads to the ground. In humility they pray. They pray for freedom.
The language is Arabic. The people are Egyptians. And the freedom is sought from social inequality, poverty and fear. This is how it felt to be part of the Jan. 25 revolution that started in Egypt’s Tahrir Square in 2011. The objective was to topple the oppressive government as well as the president. After 18 consecutive days of protesting (or tailgating if you like), the Egyptian president resigned and ceded power to the Egyptian military.
Although it has already been more than two years since this historic event, I write of it today for three reasons. Firstly, I frankly want to bring more awareness to it here in Oxford, and quite ambitiously, the whole state. Secondly, I use this very article as the base for my next one, entitled “Tailgating with the ‘divided’ Pharos,” in which I will display another, more recent revolution that erupted in Egypt only last month. When I decided to write about the more recent revolution, I realized it would be incomplete if I did not start the story from its first chapter. And the first chapter is the January 25 Revolution of 2011. Thirdly, the recent Egyptian revolutions provide a good context and occasion to take an analytical look at the U.S foreign policy in regards to the Middle East.
Prior to the Arab Spring, everything was clear before the U.S. The consequences of taking any particular diplomatic posture, be it a declaration of political alliance or animosity, implementing sanctions or issuing appropriation bills, was an easy prediction to make. The interests were clear to define. These days are gone. The Arab Spring has brought with it a dense ground fog before the U.S. as it makes its foreign policies in the Middle East. This is especially the case when it comes to deciding whether to continue to support and financially aid Egypt.
A question is due asking here. Why does the U.S. give aid to Egypt in the first place? Is it for a humanitarian cause? No. Egypt, contrary to what you may think, is a very cosmopolitan country. In addition, its excellent strategic location makes it Arab, Mediterranean, Islamic, Middle Eastern, African, and even European. If the U.S. loses Egypt as an ally, it has actually lost its popularity, already at stake, in the whole regime.
History has shown that this may result in the region aligning with Russia for armament. Add to that, Egypt’s Suez Canal is the only waterway that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, allowing ship transport between Europe and Asia. Why is this such a big deal? Because otherwise ships would have had to navigate around the whole African continent 6,000 miles to get to their destination. This explains why the Suez Canal is of irreplaceable service to Israel, the strongest U.S. ally, and thereby to the U.S. itself.
In 2009, the Egyptian authorities let Israeli warships sail through Suez Canal, aware that Israel was planning to attack Iran. If we were to make logical deductions, this means that the Canal is of one-of-a-kind benefit to both Israel and the United States should a war erupt between them and Iran. Also, the USS Kearsarge of the U.S. Navy transports troops and equipment to its bases in Asia through the Suez Canal. Furthermore, Egypt does not normally give Iran access to the Canal, yet does to the U.S. and Israel, which, as it goes without saying, is an extra perk for the latter two. In addition to all that, Egyptian authorities showed long-standing willingness to work with the U.S. on keeping the peace between Israel and Hamas. That is why the U.S. gives Egypt over a billion dollars of annual aid.
Yet when the Egyptian protesters rose up in 2011 to topple their oppressive government, which facilitated all these perks to the U.S., these perks came under risk. And the U.S. became extremely reluctant to take sides. This was manifested in conflicting statements, wavering support for the protesters, and refraining from unequivocal condemnation of the government. The questions that Washington had to face then were: “What if the revolution brought about a U.S. unfriendly government? And what would the status of Israel be?
The inevitable ultimately happened, and Egyptians toppled their government. The U.S. aligned itself with the winner. And the winner was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The Muslim Brotherhood is an offshoot from Hamas. Mohamed Morsi, who comes from the MB, became the elected president. Morsi was not as helpful to the U.S. as his predecessor, Mubarak, but he was somewhat. He was highly recognized by the U.S. for his influence on Hamas in the process of the reconciliation between Gaza and Israel last September. He also sustained most of the advantages given to the U.S. by Mubarak in exchange for U.S. aid; yet, again, he wasn’t helpful to the U.S. to the same degree.
It was worrying to the U.S., for instance, that he appeared to want to ally with Iran. During his presidency, Egypt considered allowing Iranian warships to transit through the Suez Canal. Yet just as the advantages given by Egypt to U.S. sustained, so was the U.S. aid to Egypt. And after all, the bilateral affairs between the United States and Egypt were still not really that terrible.
Internally, though, between the Egyptians and their new elected government, affairs were terrible. Actually so terrible as to make Egyptians take to streets again, and topple the elected government on June 30, 2013. With that development the bilateral relationships between Egypt and the United States took yet another new turn.
Please read my next article, which will be published on July 23, to know how.
Special thanks to Katherine Carr who inspired me to think of the article title.
